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Abstract
The paper reports the results of 39 laboratory duopoly markets for which pricing institution and
participant experience are treatments.  Cournot (C) duopolies (quantity precommitment and a
price determined to clear the market) are contrasted with Kreps-Scheinkman (KS) duopolies
(quantity precommitment and posted prices).  Inexperienced participants in KS markets have
much more difficulty selecting capacities consistent with the theoretical predictions than do those
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equilibrium prediction as C, but better depicting oligopoly markets with its two-stage, capacity-
setting and price-setting environment.  In turn, the KS model has been criticized because of the
lack of realism in the efficient pricing rule (Davidson and Deneckere, 1986), because of the
assumption that products are homogeneous (Yin and Ng, 1996) and because they do not permit
short-run capacity expansion (Boccard and Wauthy, 2000).
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Quantity Precommitment with Price Competition versus Quantity Precommitment with
Market Clearing Prices in the Laboratory
1. Introduction
Holt (1995, 377) states that “despite its prominence in the theoretical literature, the
Cournot model is deficient for the experimental study of many IO issues because the essential
mechanics of price determination are simulated.  One open question, taken from Kreps and
Scheinkman (1983), is whether quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot
outcomes (in the laboratory).”  The objective of this letter is compare the capacity setting
performance of the Kreps-Scheinkman (KS)  model with the Cournot (C) model in a laboratory
setting.
C firms select a quantity of output they will produce, and price is set to clear the market
based on the quantity produced.  In the Bertrand (B) model firms offer a price to sell output, and
the firm with the lowest price-offer sells all that is demanded at that price.  The KS model
incorporates the quantity setting of C and the price setting of B in a two-stage advance-
production environment.  KS firms first make a binding capacity decision, are informed of the
capacity of the entire market, then decide at what price they wish to sell their output.   Prices are
1
posted and demand is allocated using an efficient rationing mechanism, matching the low-price
sellers with the high-valuation buyers until no further units are demanded or no supply remains.
Davis (1999) and Muren (2000) have evaluated the performance of the KS model in2 19 January 2009
laboratory environments with homogeneous goods.  Davis runs 12 posted-offer triopoly markets,
6 without binding production commitments, and 6 with binding production commitments prior to
posting prices, effectively testing the KS model using the B model as a benchmark for
comparison.  Davis finds that quantity precommitment raises prices and lowers output from the
competitive B benchmark, but that the actual outcomes did not correspond to the theoretical
prediction of the KS model.  Muren runs 16 posted-offer triopoly markets with binding
production precommitment, 10 with inexperienced traders and 6 with experienced traders.   The
results show that inexperienced participants make capacity choices that are much higher than the
choices of inexperienced triopolists in Fouraker and Siegel (1963).  When participating in a
second session with the same parameters as the first, Muren’s participants set capacities that are
closer to the prediction of the KS and C models, but on average are still above it.  Muren does not
run sessions using C triopolies.
An experiment has not been reported that compares the capacities set by C and KS
oligopolists with identical underlying parameters.  This paper reports the results of 39 duopoly
markets.  The treatment variables are the pricing institution and trader experience.  The results
show that inexperienced participants initially choose excessively large capacities in the KS
environment relative to outputs chosen in the C environment.  Differences tend to disappear over
time.  There are no differences between experienced participants in comparable KS and C
environments.
2. Laboratory Environment 
Forty-eight inexperienced participants were recruited using notices posted on bulletin
boards on a university campus and messages posted on the university website.  Participants were  Go to  
2 http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/mceel/papers/gma1.pdf and
http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/mceel/papers/gma2.pdf for C and KS instructions.
 Available at  
3 http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/mceel/papers/gma3.pdf .
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primarily undergraduate students from various disciplines.  Sessions were conducted with pencil
and paper; each participant had a calculator.
Participants were anonymously paired with others in their session; each pair formed a
duopoly.  Communication was not allowed.  Detailed instructions were read to the participants
prior to beginning each session.   Sessions began with two practice periods during which the
2
pairings remained the same.  Pairs were then reassigned, and new pairs remained together for 12
paid periods. 
 Demand and cost information was common knowledge.  The demand function was Q =
92 – P; P was the price of output in lab dollars (L$) and Q was the total market demand at the
given price.  The market demand function was explained in the instructions, and presented to
participants in a price-quantity table.
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In C sessions, participants made one decision each period, selecting a quantity to produce
from the range 0 to 92.  The cost of each unit was L$20.  The output of both duopolists was
combined to determine the market output and the associated market-clearing price.  Participants
calculated their earnings, and moved to the next decision period.
In KS sessions, participants made two decisions each period, selecting units of capacity
from the range 0 to 92.   The cost of each unit was L$20.  After being informed of their group’s
capacity, participants selected a price between L$0 and L$92.  They were then informed of the
price selected by their group member, as well as the quantities they each were able to sell.  These4 19 January 2009
amounts were based on the demand function, using the efficient rationing mechanism. Participants
then calculated their earnings.  The specific mechanism was described in detail to the participants
in the instructions using several different examples (including equal posted prices) to illustrate
how the units sold were related to the demand schedule and the prices posted by the duopolists.
For both C and KS environments, participants had two minutes to make each decision,
enter it on their individual record sheets, and return the sheets to the session monitor.  The
monitor recorded this information and returned the record sheets to the participants after
disseminating the relevant information to all participants.  The time limit was never a binding
constraint.  Calculations were checked by the session monitors each time the participants
submitted their record sheets.  After participating in their first session, the now experienced
participants were asked if they wished to participate in another session. 
14 C markets and 10 KS markets with inexperienced participants were run.  5 C markets
and 10 KS markets were run with experienced participants.
Participants were paid privately at the end of each session.  $5.00 was guaranteed as a
show-up fee.  Earnings ranged between $15 and $37 with a mean of $23.15.  Sessions lasted
between 1 and 2.5 hours, including the reading of instructions.
3. Benchmark Outcomes
Given the underlying demand and cost parameters and the pricing institutions
characterizing the duopoly markets, three benchmark capacities or outputs are identified.  The
first benchmark is the joint profit maximizing output or capacity of 36 units.  The second
benchmark is the competitive, zero profit, outcome of 72 units.  The third benchmark is the
duopoly Nash equilibrium outcome of 48 units.  This third outcome is the theoretical prediction  In the discrete implementation of this environment in the laboratory, participants must
4
select integer output values.  There are three Nash equilibria.  One is a symmetric equilibrium
when each player selects an output of 24.  The other two result if one selects 23 and the other
selects 25.  This can happen two ways.  The equilibrium price remains 44.
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for both the C and KS environments.
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4. Results
Figure 1 displays mean per-period capacity or output for the two pricing institutions and
two levels of experience.  The data for inexperienced participants are in the leftmost 12 periods;
the data for experienced participants are in the rightmost 12 periods.  Circles represent KS
duopolies and triangles represent C duopolies.  Table 1 reports the means and standard deviations
of the mean capacity or output of the duopolies across periods 1-8 and 9-12 by institution and
experience.  The data reflect the excess capacity decisions of inexperienced KS duopolists as well
as their convergence towards the Nash equilibrium benchmark reported by Muren (2000).
[Insert Figure 1 and Table 1 Here]
Capacities set by inexperienced KS duopolists greatly exceed those set by inexperienced C
duopolists across the first 8 periods of their sessions.  The difference is significant (exact
CK S randomization test, n  = 14, n  = 10, one-sided, p = 0.000).  C duopolists tend to select
capacities very close to the Nash equilibrium benchmark.  Over time, capacities in KS duopolies
fall and approach output in C duopolies.  The average capacities selected by inexperienced KS
duopolists across periods 9-12 are not significantly different from mean output set by
CK S inexperienced C duopolists (exact randomization test, n  = 14, n  = 10, one-sided, p = 0.125). 
When duopolists are experienced in these environments, the differences between KS capacities
and C output across periods 1-8 and 9-12 are not significantly different (exact randomization  Holt (1995) notes that “in multiperiod Cournot duopolies, the outcomes fall on both
5
sides of the Cournot prediction...”
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CK S tests, n  = 5, n  = 10, one-sided, p = 0.637 and p = 0.688).
Over time there appears to be a tendency for both C and KS duopolists to reduce outputs
and capacities below the Cournot benchmark.  The evidence for this result from C duopoly
markets in the literature is mixed.   We noted there were no significant differences between the
5
mean capacities and outputs of the experienced KS and C duopolists; their aggregate mean over
periods 9-12 is 42.82 units.  Simple tests of the hypotheses that mean capacity and output selected
by experienced KS and C duopolists does not differ from the benchmark of 48 units and from the
benchmark of 36 units can be rejected in favor of the alternatives that it is less than 48 and more
than 36 (t = 2.974 for the former and t = 3.912 for the latter, the critical value at one percent for a
one-tailed test with 14 degrees of freedom is 2.624).
Suetens and Potters (2007, 71) “argue that there is often signficantly more tacit collusion
in Bertrand price-choice than in Cournot quantity-choice markets.”  This suggests that KS
duopolists may display more tacit collusion than C duopolists.  This is visually supported by the C
duopoly capacities generally exceeding that for KS duopolies for experienced duopolists. 
However, as noted above, these differences are not significant. 
5. Conclusions
Holt (1995, 377) notes that “an open question ... is whether quantity precommitment and
Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes (in the laboratory).”  Although laboratory
experiments which evaluate the performance of markets with quantity precommitment and price7 19 January 2009
posting have been conducted, none have directly addressed Holt’s question by contrasting the KS
and C environments with the same cost and demand parameters. 
The results of this experiment show that with experience, traders in laboratory duopoly
markets who have to make quantity commitments will make comparable commitments regardless
of whether they also post prices at which to sell their output or they defer the pricing decision to
an exogenous clearing mechanism.  While the behavior is comparable across pricing institutions, it
does not necessarily conform to the theory when the market structure is duopoly.8 19 January 2009
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Inexperienced Duopolists Experienced Duopolists
Periods Periods
Obs. 1-8 9-12 Institution Obs. 1-8 9-12
C 14 48.86 48.41 C 5 47.03 43.85
(6.40) (7.44) (8.53) (6.07)
KS 10 74.75 51.10 KS 10 44.79 42.30
(13.15) (7.27) (8.45) (7.32)
  C indicates markets with quantity-setting producers who do not post prices.  KS indicates
a
markets with quantity-setting producers who post prices.10 19 January 2009
Figure 1     Capacity